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Europese Beweging
Nederland

EURODÉFENSE - NEDERLAND

The sixth
Young European EURODEFENSE Conference



2-7 August 2015
Breda, the Netherlands

COMMON POSITION PAPER

European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

The world in 2025: Core Challenges - The Caucasus region

BY WORKING GROUP 1

“And in today already walks tomorrow”

- Samuel T. Coleridge

Introduction

In the light of the VI Young European EURODEFENSE Conference (YEEC) 2015, the participants of each group were asked to produce a common position paper about the theme they have previously chosen within the 5 sub-themes given. Considering the main topic of YEEC, “The Future is Now” – which resembles the words of English poet Coleridge – and our sub-theme “The world 2025: Core Challenges”, the present working paper aims to 1) give a brief glimpse overview of the current/future situation in terms of core challenges; 2) highlight the most relevant, namely geopolitical shifts and access to resources, and its core implications for European security and 3) provide some possible main responses to tackle the key threats.

Core challenges

If modern era is a social and political giant conundrum, the puzzle now appears to look more like the Enigma. The world is dramatically changing through the rapid pace of globalisation, the flows of trade and investment, and exponential growth of technology. Due to such, we are facing alarming growing threats and challenges from all corners and places which are constraining global security, putting in check Westphalian order and international law. Europe, in particular, has been at the pole front of this complex arena struggling with an increasing blur of its external and internal borders. From terrorism (special relevance to ISIS), economic crisis (Greek debt), migration (refugees in the Mediterranean) to cyber-attacks or the issue of bad governance (corruption, weak institutions or lack of accountability), all are deeply affecting the international system. This overall evolution has undoubtedly brought the spread of prosperity and innovative opportunities though it has also opened the scope for the development of weaker states (the erosion of national sovereignty) making European mechanisms on security and defence appear weak and in the need of improvement.

Although we do not neglect the importance of these diverse risks and their probable spill-over effects, we think the following ones may be, in a future prospect analysis, the most hazardous for European security:

1. **Geopolitical shifts** - The growing self-affirmation of Moscow with the recent unilateral invasion of Crimea reoriented the focus to the European stage and recalled the issue of Russian revisionism. Due to geopolitical factors and the access to resources, the South-Caucasus area has increasingly become a key strategic area, especially to Russia. The EU Eastern Partnership (EaP), already enforced in the Georgia and Azerbaijan area, might compete with the newly established Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) in the next few years. Also, there are three major players in the area: Iran, Turkey and the U.S. through NATO. Hence, in order to prevent major pressures on the area, it is a priority for the EU to secure its interests through the reinforcement of its current partnerships in the area.
2. **Access to resources** - Within security matters, one crucial interest of the EU is its energy source and suppliers. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which was built to counterbalance the influence of both Iran and Russia, was aimed to diversify the global European oil and gas supplies so that it could prevent failure from other exporters due to political instability. It may be even more relevant in the next few years to diversify European energy's partnerships in the light of the potential enlargement of the Eurasian Union. The past transit dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, that had direct impact on European gas imports, is a striking example of the consequences of such political conflicts over the EU energy security. Thus, the future challenge consists of protecting the South-Caucasus countries in order to prevent and contain external conflicts to spread throughout the EU's borders.

Recommendations

Given the above mentioned potential scenarios, it seems to be recommendable to consider the following points to enhance international cooperation while aiming for a preventive and comprehensive approach in the European legal and institutional framework.

1. **Implement a comprehensive security strategy** - During the last Eastern Partnership Summit hold in Riga in May, Azerbaijan and Georgia reaffirmed their will to have a greater protection of their energy supplies. The challenge of the EU is then to back these countries up with military capabilities and rapid reaction mechanisms in order to prevent hypothetical conflicts that might rise in this highly strategic area. The best way to do so would be to implement a comprehensive security strategy engaging the EU, NATO, the OSCE and other stakeholders.

2. **Reframe and rethink deeply the EaP in order to counterbalance the attractiveness of the ECU** - One well-known critic addressed to the EaP is its Eurocentric perception. The goal is then to work in closer cooperation with each of the countries separately.

3. **Avoid anti-Russian rhetoric** - The Russian Federation may use Western military cooperation with the EaP as a pretext to destabilise the region. Raimonds Vejonis, the former President of Latvia, had stressed this point several times during the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU saying that anti- Russian rhetoric would be counterproductive for the EU and for its allies.



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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

The world in 2025: Core Challenges - The Russian game

BY WORKING GROUP 2

Europe is at a crossroads. After 75 years of having a continent at relative peace, we are on the verge of a second Cold War. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Europe has responded by issuing economic sanctions and even though both parties are suffering, Russia does not seem to back down. Is it possible that Europe and Russia are playing different games? Maybe Europe should be reevaluating its approach in order to avoid seeing the end of one of longest lasting periods of peace the European continent has ever known.

Current (and future) European security threats are manifold, but almost all of these threats are only being dealt with on the symptom level. Meaning, if one only deals with the symptoms, the main causes are not being treated and the symptoms will keep rearing their heads. When Russia invaded Crimea and de facto annexed it not much later, the EU responded by issuing increasingly harsh economic sanctions. However, the EU never seemed to question Russia's motives on a broad level. We assumed, and still do, that Russia is an expansionist, revisionist state that seeks to break the Western sphere of influence at its borders. But is that really Russia's motive? The EU has up till now assumed that it is. However, John J. Mearsheimer wrote an article for Foreign Affairs at the end of 2014 in which he explained that the EU has put all its trust in the victory of liberal beliefs after the end of the Cold War and therefore disregarded realism and the importance of power politics. If the EU would at least weigh all the options and think about other reasons behind Russia's recent actions, we might come to the conclusion that we have been treating Russia in a completely wrong way.

What if Russia is rebalancing because it feels threatened by EU and NATO expansion? Does Russia feel threatened because it is a declining power instead of a rising, revisionist power? If the EU would reconsider treating Russia using outdated Cold War thinking, we might start trying to save EU-Russia relations instead of escalating tension. In fact, Russia has been very vocal ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union about not wanting the EU and NATO to expand eastward and closer to Russia's borders. This should have been a clear warning that Russia was and still is thinking in terms of power politics and that it does not put as much faith

in liberal values that the EU and the West in general proud themselves on. The EU should start to understand that Russia is playing a different game, and try to keep communication channels open whilst trying to speak the same language in order to avoid having chickens talking to ducks, as the Chinese say.

The way Europe is dealing with Russia today is putting Europe's security at risk. The conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine have shown that Europe's borders are very sensitive and that they need to be secured. This issue must be dealt with carefully in order to avoid an armed conflict with Russia while avoiding to sacrifice countries that are aspiring to enjoy the same freedom as Europe does; this problem will remain in the future if Europe doesn't realise that other actors might not share its liberal view of the world and adapt its behaviour accordingly. Putin seems to feel threatened by NATO, and Europe should use this but avoid relying exclusively on NATO, especially if it doesn't carry its share of the burden. European countries should be investing more in their defence and consolidating it at the european level which will also be beneficial to NATO.

This would show the US that Europe is a real partner that can act as a security producer and not only as a security consumer. Avoiding, in turn, that US turns its back to Europe. It is absolutely necessary that all european countries contribute to this effort and put their differences aside, so that Europe can be stronger and united on security and defence's issues. Such a strong cooperation would counterbalance Putin's power play in Eastern Europe. Europeans don't wish to go to war but it should be very clear that Europe will not stand idle if its security or its values are being threatened. Building a strong European defence and reinforcing NATO should send a message deterring Russia from aggression. Deterrence is the only way Europe has to deal with Putin's use of hard power.

The lack of a common defence and a common identity questions Europe's existence and its place in the world. We urgently need a unified Europe and coordinated defence in order to address the security issues faced by our continent. This is something that is of concern to all member countries and they should involve themselves in the development of a common solution. The economic crisis from which Europe has suffered for the past years dividing the northern and southern countries, has lead to a critical loss of identity. Building a common defence would also help in rebuilding a European identity. As such, it is urgent to mobilise european population and governments in favour of a coordinated and integrated european defence which is the only way to insure each country's security. Europe must remember its identity and the values and principles on which it was built. Without being internally united, Europe will never be able to deal with external problems.



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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

Security of the European Homeland - Improve intelligence sharing by empowering Europol

BY WORKING GROUP 3

Introduction

In the framework of the VI Young European EURODEFENSE Conference we are very honoured to make this policy recommendations regarding the Security of the European Homeland.

In our point of view, terrorism appears as the main threat with an extended range of consequences to the stability and security in Europe. We identified direct and indirect challenges posed by terrorism:

- The recruitment/radicalisation in Europe;
- The sense of fear and insecurity left by previous attacks in Europe;
- Cyber-attacks and cyber-terrorism;
- Migration. We acknowledge that the migration flows that we have been noticed in the Mediterranean have also other sources. However, the persecutions and fear caused by terrorist organisations in regions such as North of Africa, Sahel and Middle East, forces people to leave their homes and find safety in Europe. These are resulting in a humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean sea, with direct impact to the stability of southern European states;
- The globalisation process prompt the interconnection of terrorism with other threats namely Human Rights violations, arms smuggling, organised crime;
- Maritime Security. The sea and the ocean are also targets of terrorist attacks, which can put in danger communication and trade routes.

The arc of instability instead the ring of friends is making space for terrorist groups to enhance their power. In addition, the US pivot changing towards Asia-Pacific and the withdraw from Europe forces European countries to do more for their own security. Moreover, the economic

crisis and declining defence budgets leads European Union's Member States to realise that they should do more and more together.

In face of this scenario we present some recommendations on the improvement of EUROPOL work, and a step-by-step project to be integrated in EUROPOL framework, in order to assure stability and security in Europe and mainly to European citizens¹.

EUROPOL is the European Union's law enforcement agency whose main goal is to help achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all European Union's citizens. EUROPOL does this by assisting the European Union's Member States in their fight against serious international crime and terrorism. However, EUROPOL has some weakness that should be overcome such as:

- Dissimulation of cooperation between European Union's Member States and between European Union's Institutions;
- Some EUROPOL protocols are not ratified by all Member States;
- Some legal instruments like EUROPOL officers mandate are not clear and narrow in its approach. They do not allow officers to cross the borders when they need to.
- In this framework we recommend:
- Improvement on EUROPOL officers mandate in dealing with issues cross-borders, making it more clear and efficient.
- Increase joint-work between European Union's Member States and Institutions.

Within EUROPOL framework we also suggest the integration of an Intelligence Platform with two main goals. On one hand, this platform should increased EUROPOL capabilities regarding the research of information and his analysis. On the other hand, this platform should facilitate the information exchange between the twenty-eight European Union's Member States, based on a sense of trust and cooperation.

The main aspects that we suggest on the creation and integration of this platform in the EUROPOL framework are:

- This body should be integrated in EUROPOL framework and therefore EUROPOL facilities, avoiding a long process of negotiations in dealing with complex legal issues;
- The personnel must be selected after a common exam in European Union's Member States based on equality between member states and European citizens. With this selection process we contribute with employment measures, and at the same time having represented all

¹ We acknowledge the importance of people safety abroad too, and the positive impact that this recommendation can also have in dealing with external security issues. However, our topic was related to Homeland Security and because of that we didn't focus our attention in external issues.

member states in an equal basis it could contribute to trust-building and a more cooperative spirit in intelligence framework;

- The exchange of information, regarding terrorism, should focus, at a starting point, in the identification of financing and recruitment.

In order to evaluate the success of this project we decided to do a SWOT analysis (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats). As main strengths we identified:

- Facilitates the exchange of information. We perceived that the selection process of personnel based on equality between member-states could enhance their availability to exchange information;
- This Intelligence Platform can be used as a trust-building instrument between member states once it deals with exchange of national sensitive information;
- Intelligence is a comprehensive instrument, besides terrorism it can deal with other transnational and complex threats.

As far it concerns to Weakness and Threats we perceived that this is an ambitious project because it deals with national sensitivities and states are not willing to give up on their sovereignty. We see the arc of instability surrounding Europe and the increased complexity of the threats; the US pivot changing towards Asia-Pacific; the EU desire to play a more capable work as global actor and the review of the European Security Strategy as main opportunities to establish the project that we present.

The Security of European Homeland does not start abroad, it starts at home. The globalisation process is making threats more transnational and more complex, and states cannot deal with it alone. The arc of instability surrounding Europe and US withdraw must force European countries to do more, to make a comprehensive analysis about threats, and, the most important, to cooperate more. As Sir Winston Churchill once said “We are running out of money, so it is time to start thinking” and therefore think together. In light of this, we suggest an increased on EUROPOL capabilities and the integration of an Intelligence Platform where states will be represented in an equal basis with the main focus on exchange information and building trust. We perceived that the integration process on security and defence issues should start now and should be funded in trust and cooperation and for that we suggest a step-by-step intelligence platform where member states must begin to learn how to work together.



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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

Security of the European Homeland - The EU as intelligence producer

BY WORKING GROUP 4

“The threat has never been as great. We’ve never faced this kind of terror in our history.”
- Manuel Valls

Introduction

These were the words of French Prime Minister Manuel Valls at the end of april 2015 talking about a fairly recent kind of enemy and method, jihadist terrorism.¹ Indeed since 9/11 world terrorism has become the 1st security threat to human, state and global security.

Since the beginning of 2015, two terrorists attacks have occurred at the heart of the European Union, in Paris and Copenhagen and many are being prevented from happening on a regular basis thanks to Europol and states’ own intelligence and security services.

The political instability within neighbouring countries have created an arc of instability around Europe that has allowed the development of important terrorist organisations like ISIS whose unprecedented scope, wealth and means of action represent the main threat to our homeland security.

We define the Strategy for European Homeland security as the “concerted effort between the 28 states within the European Union to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure and resilient.”

Although homeland security strategy can focus on many threats like natural disasters, organised crime etc. we decided to focus on the way for the European union to tackle the ideological, islamic and politically motivated terrorism coming from abroad but also as the most recents events have shown deeply rooted within our boundaries. Therefore terrorism is a very harsh enemy that should be fought on all fronts.

¹ See William Horobin, *Prime Minister Says France Faces Unprecedented Terror Threat*, In: The Wall Street Journal, 23 April 2015. See www.wsj.com/articles/prime-minister-says-france-faces-unprecedented-terror-threat-1429775175.

A military response to ISIS in Iraq by a coalition of states is currently underway but will certainly not be sufficient. Actually this form of insurgency may never be completely defeated but can be permanently contained. In that way we thought about alternative strategies to counter-terrorism within the European Union and ensure our homeland security.

Strategy

The development of counter-terrorist institutions of EU became lately somehow stalled, even though the terrorist threats have not diminished. Current trends in terrorism have transformed into uncertain, liquid-like environment, much more vulnerable to global instabilities. The times of the 2000's, with focus on weapons of mass destruction, failed states paradigm and state sponsored terrorism are long gone. While we suggest that the proposed new institutions should address these new challenges, the old ones should not be forgotten.

Following the strategy to secure our common European homeland, we identified one major problem: intelligence sharing. While the current structure for intelligence sharing, partly under Europol and partly under EU Satellite centre, is indeed cleverly designed, it is not considered attractive by the majority of member states. They rather prefer on day-to-day basis the bilateral cooperation and increasingly choose not to "send" their critical intelligence into the common pool of EU institutions. Therefore we believe that by strengthening and intensifying intelligence capability of EU and its members is one of the tools, how to make European homeland, more secure.

Institutions

The past has shown us, that while strategies and lofty ideas can be drafted, they only seldom flourish in form of actual viable institutions. The solution therefore is not to empower Europol or to "order" the member states to send their intelligence to the common pool. It also cannot be the aim to create a "common CIA" in Europe. We propose the creation of three new institutional bodies, either under EEAS, under Council secretariat or just as a standalone agency of EU.

Firstly, we would create a new body under EEAS: OSINT (Open-source Intelligence). This "intelligence agency" would not operate with the members countries raw or analysed intelligence, but its research and analysis would be based on open-source intelligence. Citizen/journalist based agencies (like Bellingcat and ARES) have been very helpful not just with bringing attention to new realities and manipulations in this war-torn, unstable world, but (in the case of Bellingcat) have been also cooperating with one of the oldest member states, whose citizens have been murdered in cold blood (and are therefore theoretically subjected to Article 222 of TEU²).

² The so-called "solidarity clause".

A proposed agency would provide member states (and High representative) with reliable and high-quality analysis in times, when simple information becomes increasingly weaponised by non-EU actors. The proposed OSINT agency could be similar in its structure to the EU ISS.

Secondly, to give EU better capabilities in fighting the new terrorism, we call for a European Commission amendment of Europol criminal database and revision of the system of collecting. Our idea centres around a system, where a member state would share pre-designated part of its gathered national intelligence/criminal database on a regular basis. Either member states would choose themselves which part they will share or the selection mechanism would be agreed upon on session of European council or FAC.

Thirdly we propose a renewed focus on satellite intelligence (IMINT) cooperation on basis of EDA, CSDP and ESA programs. This is crucial for retaining needed intelligence satellite capability, since the cost of covering all intelligence needs of Europe (for comparison, US NRO is the largest, most expensive and indeed most valued US intelligence agency). Current EU Satellite Centre is a good starting point, from which the supranational EU Satellite Agency could be developed. While we understand this is a politically sensitive issue, we think that any development should start by a production of position paper of working group, chaired by High Representative for CFSP. Special emphasis should be put on the "economy side and savings", such a wide satellite intelligence could bring to the member states.

Naturally, we understand that it is very easy to speak about "intensifying cooperation" and doing "more coordination in field of intelligence sharing", we are trying to put more than ambitious proposals as simple "food for thought".

Developmental approach

We live in an interconnected world which is full of challenges. To face this challenges, the European Union must find the best ways to protect its citizens and give them a safe place to live in. To do that, the authorities should cooperate inside and outside the EU borders. Moreover, the Union should promote the democratic values among foreign citizens.

To fulfil this aim, we think that we should collaborate with the national authorities of the other countries. They can provide local information as culture, habits and ways of thinking and about political situation. The EU must use this information in order to conceive and implement programs for educating people. It is true that in the Muslim countries, for example, religion is very important and it is the guideline for most of the people, but, once taught well, with no doctrines, it can be as normal as in any other EU country. People can be taught that there is no necessity to shoot someone if that person does not believe in the same God as they do. Democratic values are also very important. With the support of those countries governments, EU can and should provide educational programs for the citizens, using national

professionals. Once people are educated, they learn to respect each other personal space and beliefs. And this a way to change minds and, then, we can reduce the risk of terrorism.

In addition, we think that the EU citizens must be educated in order to help their national authorities. For this, there should be created an European program through the citizens can be taught how to react to terrorist attacks. On the other side, EU must be aware of the fact it is not alone and must establish partnerships. In the world, there are other countries and organisations that can contribute to the welfare of the people. Once a bilateral relationship is established, the EU citizens can live in a safer and more open-minded world.

In order to complete this vision there is a commission called EUROPEaid, whose missions can be extended. For example, it should be prepared to deliver not only financial aid but also to contribute with human resources to teach democratic values to groups of professionals who are capable of transmitting the information to their con-nationals coming from the vulnerable countries.

Conclusion

We live in a world which is more dangerous than ever and new ways of securing our European homeland are now more necessary then ever. We propose a new strategy which focusses on these new threats and calls for a new way of looking at intelligence sharing. Three new institutions will make open-source intelligence sharing possible, enhance the work of Europol and create a shared pool of satellites in order to regain full control of our own homeland. As a way of pro-active security we also provide the EU citizen and the countries in our neighbourhood, with a teaching program which will focus on respect and ways lessons on how to react in case of a terrorist attack.



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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

EU Maritime Security Strategy - Collective training and capacity building

BY WORKING GROUP 5

Introduction

Over the last 1000 years Europe has flourished mainly thanks to trade by maritime routes. Nowadays, this form of trade still plays a crucial role in the economies of the EU. Not only for countries bordering the sea, but also for countries surrounded by land, due to the integration of the EU economies. By now 90% of the external trade and 40% of the internal trade in the EU is fully dependent of the sea, showing the importance of this issue and the need for stability.¹ In this paper, we define some aspects of cooperation which could be improved on both the African and European side to tackle challenges on either side.

African Challenges

First, European advisors on maritime matters should be sent to help African maritime forces to deal with the challenges at stake. In this manner, Europeans can share experience in coast guarding, control of maritime space and fishery in order to help them to build an efficient and rapid response force at sea.

Second, Europe could increase the level of their maritime academies by sending experts and increasing exchanges with European maritime academies to allow some trainees to have access and learn our standards and exchange experience with foreign trainees.

Further, the European Union should invest in maritime capacities for these countries regarding to the lack of means of their military. Invent new funding mechanisms to permit these countries to get the new and modern equipment they need.

¹ See Alexandre Reis Rodrigues, *Estratégia de Segurança Marítima Europeia: Porquê e Para Quê?*, In: *Reflexões sobre a Europa*, Instituto da Defesa Nacional 2014, p. 170. See <http://www.idn.gov.pt/index.php?mod=1321&cod=140#sthash.mUVD0PGj.dpbs>

We strongly believe that information and intelligence data should be shared in order to counter organised crime, illicit trades such as drugs and human trafficking. Therefore, developing trust between intelligence agencies of both continents encourages information sharing.

The European Union should maintain its current separate approach of the cooperation with these countries regarding the rivalries between them, especially Algeria and Morocco or Libya and Tunisia. This emphasises a pragmatic short term strategy with individual states.

On the long term, the EU should strive for a maritime multinational force consisting of the countries of the European Union and African countries. It could improve significantly the standards of North African countries and make the response of European Union more efficient.

European Challenges

Due to a lack of efficient cooperation between the member states, maritime and migration problems are not properly tackled. In this part we shall provide four steps for an efficient cooperation between these countries. First, a decent common education should be provided. Second, compatible material, communication channels and procedures between these countries should be used. Third, we strive for a 'hub-network' that should be established for decision making and the executive approach. Finally, member states should invest more in combined maritime operations.

As discussed in the above, common education between acting nations contributes to a collective approach. A successful example of a collective approach is the NLBEOps school (a cooperation between the Netherlands and Belgian navies). This school provides a common education for both parties, which will improve cooperation by implementing the same base for all participants.

Another important fact that we have pointed out, is the use of the same equipment and procedures for a compatible approach. More compatibility will result in higher efficiency and interoperability.

Thirdly, a new organisation should be founded. We believe a 'hub-network' suits this structure best. In this manner, one central point is in charge of the coordination and the decision making process. The benefit of a 'hub-network' is that all information goes via one point which makes the loss of information smaller, makes the feeling of responsibility high and provides a clear hierarchy in the organisation.

Migrants and refugees attempting to reach the EU have put high burden on the social welfare system in the European countries. When these migrants are dispersed between member states,

this burden would even have a direct impact on landlocked or Northern European countries. These countries may not be fully aware of the relevance of the investment in stability and safety at sea, therefore the level of awareness for this subject among these countries must be increased. The high dependency of the EU economy on maritime trade routes may be a target for state or non-state actors. The latter includes terrorism, piracy, smuggling, organised crime which may interfere with the EU trade routes and disrupt or slow down economic development. Our proposal is to move for a common budget for maritime security operations, funded by all member states. In this case, the non-maritime member states will also contribute to the efforts protecting their economic interests.

Conclusion

It is clear that the European Union should not underestimate the importance of a stable periphery. Key points of this paper are to tackle the African problems by investing in capacity building, response improvement and by improving relations between the EU and African nations. European problems could be resolved by a combined maritime education, same use of materials and establishing a 'hub-network'. Finally, the stability and safety in the EU maritime territory is important in order to secure the well-being of the integrated EU economies.



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EU Maritime Security Strategy - A strategy and mandate for fighting illegal migration in the Mediterranean Sea

BY WORKING GROUP 6

Introduction

The recent crisis of immigrants attempting to reach the European Union (EU) by sea, often travelling in dangerously over-crowded and unseaworthy boats into Europe, shows the importance of the humanitarian and security issue. An increase of more than 300% last year of (illegal) refugees entering the Central Mediterranean forces the EU to react in due time to develop the current EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS).

Objective

The objective of this paper is trying to understand the situation and find the maritime security solution for the present Mediterranean immigration crisis, meaning the refugees coming from the horn of Africa entering the EU. Most refugees are coming from throughout the whole continent of Africa and cross the border from North African countries to enter European border countries, such as Spain, Italy and Greece. The research focus of this paper will be on the work of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) near the coast of Italy. The case-study will be about African refugees coming from Libya crossing the sea to the Italian coast.

Background and Proposals

In terms of security the importance of the Mediterranean is high since crises and instabilities surrounding it. Instability and insurgent network activity across Northern Africa in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Mali has been increasingly worrying. The main motivation for refugees to cross the Mediterranean Sea is fleeing from poverty or (political) prosecution or violence. In Particular Libya is an important canal for refugees coming to Europe due to the fact that Libya at this moment is a lawless state after the overthrow of Colonel Khadafy.

In 2012 the African Union adopted '2050 Africa's integrated Maritime Strategy', which is long term approach to the collective response of all marine crimes in the territorial waters of the Member States of the African Union and in international waters. This is a strategy, structured on the fundamental principles of the human security approach, which means that it is aimed at both addressing the root causes of insecurity and improving everyday life of the citizens of the Member States of the African Union. According to Aim Strategy, the threats and vulnerabilities in the Africa's Maritime Domain include, among others: Transnational Organised Crimes in the maritime domain inter alia migrant smuggling and asylum.

However, the smuggling of migrants is not only EU or Africa's problem, but truly a global concern with a large number of countries affected by it as origin, transit or destination points. Profit seeking criminals smuggle migrants across borders and between continents.

Migrant smuggling is both a criminal justice and a human rights issue. However, law enforcement remains a national activity confined to a single territorial jurisdiction, while organised crime is transnational in scope. In effect, law enforcement still continues to operate in a bordered world, whereas organised crime operates in a borderless world. Many states have limited capacity to enforce laws against transnational organised crime. Consequently, smugglers are able to operate from safe havens, using a mix of corruption and violence to perpetuate the weakness of the states from which they operate. In 2000, the General Assembly adopted a Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. Yet the Protocol fails to provide a clear and comprehensive framework of rules capable of effectively achieving its purposes. To transform migrant smuggling into a high-risk and low-profit operation, it is essential to disrupt the business model of criminal groups and bring the perpetrators to justice. This requires laws and regulations to investigate and prosecute migrant smuggling networks and the ability of EU Agencies to provide support. It also requires enhancing the capacities of law enforcement agencies, stronger coordination judiciary structures in the EU and a multi-agency approach.

At this moment the Navy vessels operating in the area have no proper mandate to do anything except rescuing the victims out of the water. They are unable to prosecute, or even to interrogate the persons picked out of the water. A solution could be to expand the mandate and to get the same conditions as the EU got for mission Atalanta. In this way it would be able to prosecute the smugglers, but also to prevent the small, unstable boats from leaving the Libyan shore. This can be executed with boots on the ground or insertions by Special Forces, but this has to be done with great caution due to the fact that IS is very active in the region.

In this regard the European Union should take the lead position and address need for proper laws to combat migrant smugglers internationally and effectively. Therefore, we suggest that HP/VP Mrs. Mogherini, in close cooperation with regional partners such as African Union,

should request Security Council for adoption of a Chapter 7 resolution which will provide the mandate to enforce laws and measures to fight the smugglers not only at sea but also on coast or land.

Meanwhile EU should also start with a comprehensive approach in Libya (as in Somalia): supporting the UN recognised government and to give the Libyan coastguard proper equipment and training so they are able to protect their own borders in the future. An increased cooperation between the EU Navy's and Coast Guard, with the establishment of a real European Coastguard at the end, could make the borders of Europe a lot safer.

Conclusion

There will never be an ideal solution to tackle the migration, humanitarian and maybe terrorism problem in the Mediterranean Sea. The solution of this problem isn't at sea but on land. On the long run the EU and the UN need to improve the situation in Africa, so people would not feel the need to risk their lives anymore for a better life.



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COMMON POSITION PAPER

European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

Industrial and technological base - Harmonisation of European Defence Market through a Common Defence Research Programme

BY WORKING GROUP 7

In the following proposal, our working group of EURODEFENSE aims to argue in favour of a future EU defence research programme. We believe that such a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-oriented research programme would significantly contribute to a harmonisation and overall improvement of the European defence market.

Technological innovations which are employed during the war find their industrial origin in the Research and Development (R&D). Composed of the Research and Technology (R&T) – which provides scientific and technological expertise to create new programs – and R&D – which is composed by phases of industrial development – R&D is a central prerequisite for the European industrial and technological base.

The challenge

Today, European defence industry is confronted with an ever increasing global competition. However, market powers have a very limited influence in the defence market, which is still dominated by sovereign interests. Despite of the European internal market, the European defence market is not fully integrated. We are also facing a fragmented demand side, as every Member State orders slightly different systems instead of one, compatible system (see case of the NH90). This problem is also visible when looking at the United States, which are spending each year more than 70 billion euros to the R&D¹, in comparison to the European countries which are spending under 10 billion euros².

¹ See National Science Foundation, *Federal R&D Funding, by Budget Function: Fiscal Years 2013–15*, November 17 2014. See <http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2015/nsf15306/#chp2&chp1>.

² See European Defence Agency, *Fact Sheet: EU and US government defence spending in 2011*, 5 september 2013. Available at <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/factsheet-eu-us-defence-data-2011>.

Example: Drones market

The drones market is the result of the research program initiated during the 1980-1990 decade. The drones market is nowadays dominated by the American industries (such as Boeing, General Atomics, Aeronautical Systems...) and by the Israeli industries (such as IAI and Elbit).

At the European level, the capacity needs aren't well defined and are different between EU Member States. In this context, research is essentially financed by industries. The main of the programs are in the R&D phase, that's why a lot of research centres and institutes from universities are associated (such as Onera, QinetiQ, DLR, FOI, TNO). As a result, we can say that industrial efforts are often duplicated unnecessarily.

The proposal

In this context, the field of defence industry has to be restructured at the EU level in order to gain in terms of competitiveness, efficiency and development of future technologies. Moreover, the increase of cooperative programmes would permit to make the collaboration more efficient and to reduce the cost of the development of new technologies in total. In order to have an effective European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB), we will present some ideas especially concerning the R&D and the European defence market. The main objective of this project is to foster and simplify the cooperation between defence industries and, consequently, armies and to improve the EU's defence capabilities.

This very moment is a perfect opportunity. The EU has already raised the idea of a common industrial defence policy, in a Commission strategy of 2013.³ Partly, related projects can already be financed within the context of dual-use technology (Horizon 2020)⁴. Now the EU is working on a common research programme for the defence sector, and has founded the High-level Group of Personalities⁵ to advise on how the EU could support defence research programmes relevant to the CSDP. Also the June 2015 European Council has acknowledged the need for "the EU budget to ensure appropriate funding for the preparatory action on CSDP related research, paving the way for a possible future defence research and technology programme."⁶

³ See European Commission, *Towards a more competitive and efficient defence sector*, COM/2013/0542. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52013DC0542>

⁴ European Commission, *EU funding for Dual use, A practical guide to accessing EU funds for European Regional Authorities and SMEs*, October 2014, pp. 43-48. Available at https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/MFA/EU_funding_for_Dual_Use_-_Guidebook.pdf

⁵ European Defence Agency, *High-level Group of Personalities on defence research issues statement*, Brussels - 18 June, 2015. See www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2015/06/18/high-level-group-of-personalities-on-defence-research-issues-statement.

⁶ General Secretariat of the Council, *European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions*, p. 7. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/26-euco-conclusions/>

The Commission and the European Defence Agency can make an important contribution to strengthening the European defence and security sector right now.

This future defence research programme should in many characteristics resemble the Horizon 2020 framework programme (we propose $\frac{1}{4}$ of the 78 billion Euro's of Europe 2020). In the context of the programme, the European Defence Agency (EDA) should play a central role in the process of formulating the aims.

The basic idea is that EU funds are granted for projects, which target defence and dual-use technologies or innovations which are politically desirable. Therefore, the European equipment requirements should be coordinated on a Member State level, so that companies can estimate a realistic demand of the final technologies or goods.

In consequence, if the EU wants to continue to develop superior quality equipment, and avoid to buy in the USA, a generalisation of the cooperation and a Europeanisation of the R&D are two essential points to guarantee the position of the European defence industry the world.

Main suggestions

- Funding for multinational projects with participants from at least three countries:
 - Experts cooperating to develop leading technologies for our troops;
 - Foster joint procurement projects, and
 - Interdisciplinary projects, such as legal studies.⁷

- Funding for projects with SME participation:
 - Make it easier for SMEs to access relevant EU funding mechanisms, and the market of industrial strategic clusters;
 - European products should be the best and most affordable, so there is no need to purchase goods abroad (especially US), and
 - Support local SMEs to improve European know-how and create jobs.

- Credible commitment of the Member States to eventually buy the developed successful technologies:
 - Coordination process conducted by the EDA;
 - Contributing to the interoperability of armies, and
 - No further cuts in European defence budgets.

⁷ For example: How to harmonise the legal framework in a way that soldiers from other countries could use the equipment of others?

Conclusion - prepare for the future!

To conclude, there are some measures which can contribute to make the defence industry more competitive, efficient and effective and create jobs in the EU: project funding especially for multinational projects including SMEs and credible commitments from the Member States to harmonise their equipment and to work together more closely. This moment is the right time to address this issue for the next phase of the research framework programmes from 2020 onwards. If these measures are not taken, it poses us as EU to the serious threat of losing capabilities and the race vis-à-vis other economies.



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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now Industrial and Technological Base - Autonomous Weapons

BY WORKING GROUP 8

Introduction

Autonomous weapons are the consequences of the evolution of technology and society. For example the human body cannot follow all of the technologic advancements and society is less willing to accept the loss of a soldiers' life.

There is no internationally agreed definition of autonomous weapons but we can define this as a weapon which does not need human interference to select and engage targets.

That being said, we have to accept that autonomous weapons are on their way and it is not an option to neglect this. Thus, we have to find a way to make sure that the arrival of autonomous weapons is controlled and does not cause any major unforeseen issues for society. The fact that autonomous weapons are on their way, raises many questions. For example:

- How do we prevent that possible hostilities will develop their autonomous weapons faster than us and use them against us?
- How can we shield against a cyber-attack on such a system and ensure that it is not used against innocent people?
- Is it possible to create an autonomous weapon that is reliable and does not under any circumstances engage innocent targets?
- How can we combine ethics and development of technology in this future field of weapons?
- Can European industries be leaders in field of autonomous weapons? Is it feasible to create a partnership between corporations on a unique and ambitious project such as autonomous weapons?

In this position paper we will present a common vision on several subjects which are relevant in the context of European development towards autonomous weapons. In this context we firstly will present the strengths and weaknesses of the EU at this moment, this enables us to focus on formulating an approach towards achieving a European autonomous weapon system. Assuming that the strengths will remain, a way forward will be presented based on the stated

weaknesses. Finally, a brief view on the ethical considerations, which cannot be ignored, will be given.

Strengths & Weaknesses

Reviewing the strengths of the current situation in the EU gives us an overview of the possibilities and opportunities. The weaknesses show the main areas of improvement and where we can prevent possible threats.

Strengths

1. Big industries and cooperation are present within the EU and provide a solid base.
2. Within the EU we have access to ample resources such as cutting-edge knowledge and expertise.
3. The level of education within the EU is high and there are numerous advanced R&D facilities which results in valuable innovation.
4. The EU has political structures in place to facilitate efficient cooperation and policy making.
5. The EU as a whole is a considerable market for this application.
6. The EU has political and commercial influence to enable cooperation with partners outside of the EU, providing even more opportunities.

Weaknesses

1. All member states have their own individual interests; therefore there is a lack of common policy.
2. R&D activities are currently inefficiently fragmented between individual members.
3. Lack of common regulations, therefore resulting in different requirements.
4. Lack of industrial cooperation, leading to inefficiency.
5. European institutions are often slow and complex.
6. Non-optimal use of limited funding.
7. Limited access to raw materials and thus the dependency on non-EU nations.

Although only explicitly mentioned for the first, we believe that formulating a common policy will improve the first six weaknesses.

Common framework

For the EU to effectively start developing autonomous weapons, the most important aspect in the construction of such a project is a proper structure and framework.

Therefore, it is crucial to create a common policy in order to align on common interests, requirements, R&D activities, regulations, (industrial) cooperation, streamlining processes and decision making and funding.

The development of autonomous weapon can advance in an unpredictable way and might have unforeseen events. This can for the majority be smoothed by a common policy that all member states agree to. However, it does not seem realistic to assume that the rules of such a policy are continuously unanimously agreed upon within the state members. Nevertheless, it is essential that the member states all accept this policy to some degree. Exceptions or revisions to this common policy can be made, due to unforeseen events.

The way forward

Divergent Interests / Lack of one Policy

Divergent interests will always exist and is dependable on numerous variables such as culture, available industry and geopolitical situation. It is essential to find a common ground and make concessions. A common policy based on common grounds will likely be more acceptable for all member states.

A common policy should result in centralised institutions with less rigidity, clearer hierarchy and a simplified structure and decision process. A commission which is reviewed by all member states should be given the mandate for decision making.

Divergent Requirements

Different requirements are a main cost driver. Different requirements require more tailored solutions and prevent the industry from working efficiently. Requirements which are aligned will ensure lean and cost efficient development, production, utilisation and maintenance.

R&D and Industrial Activities Fragmented

Currently multiple R&D and industrial activities within the EU are fragmented, therefore the same wheel is invented multiple times. Although competition is good for stimulation quality and lower costs, more efficient division of R&D and industrial activities should enable more effective use of funding and resources.

Regulations Differentiation

Having a standardised set of regulations for autonomous weapons, will be more efficient, as is already proven in the EASA certification regulation for aircraft. This prevents that the industry and R&D activities are not aligned.

Golden Triangle

Cooperation between EU governments, industry and R&D facilities should create incentive to commonly invest in activities. This should reduce to financial load on the EU taxpayer. Advancements in sub-systems can be made for dual use, enabling industry and R&D to access the civil market as well. This will be beneficial for a more applied technology, which in turn reduces costs and also offers opportunities for SME's.

Ethical Considerations


Technological advancement will make weapon systems more effective and efficient, which is something to strive for. Presumably, the more autonomous a weapon system is the more effective it can be, as analysis and decision making is efficiently performed by the weapons system. This translates in to quicker, more decisive use of action. On the other hand, this might lead to the depreciation of human life, as the effort and threshold for taking a human life will be lowered.

Public opinion and overall agreement will play a decisive role in enabling a weapons system to be fully autonomous.

Conclusions

It is worthwhile for the EU to invest in the development of autonomous weapons, as their arrival will be inevitable and therefore we need to be properly prepared. Furthermore, it is an opportunity for the EU to become a technology leader. Although the EU has many strengths, still some hurdles need to be overcome. A main objective is to formulate a common policy. This enables a lean approach and effective and efficient use of funding and resources.

Looking at the future, also the ethical aspect will have to be considered timely.





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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now

Multinational Operational Frameworks - Pooling & Sharing 2.0: Fundamental for successful security and defence cooperation?

BY WORKING GROUP 9

In recent decades, European Security and Defence Frameworks have gone through an impressive evolution. Although substantial progress has been made, there is still lots of room for improvement concerning multinational operational EU frameworks. Within the EU the dichotomy between politics and policy is quite obvious. On the one hand, the EU as an institution has seen a growth of its power and influences. The power of the European Parliament increased significantly after the Lisbon Treaty. On the other hand however, individual nations still enjoy a considerable amount of independency and sovereignty. In the field of Security and Defence matters, this has proven to be a considerable barrier for improving cooperation and integration.

Although recent operations have largely been successful, they have demonstrated critical gaps in European security capabilities. But while defence budgets are under pressure and investment is in decline, costs of major defence systems are rising. For European Member States cooperation in defence is the solution to acquire and maintain critical capabilities. Further improvement can be stimulated by intensifying pooling and sharing. Pooling and sharing is an increasingly interesting and efficient method in promoting defence and security cooperation. Although the principle of voluntarism – as well as national sovereignty – still plays an important role in the implementation of EU-policy, mandatory aspects should be added and integrated in the process of pooling and sharing. An efficient method that could boost pooling and sharing is the founding of a comprehensive EU-wide mandatory budget. Each member state should financially contribute a certain amount to the security – and wellbeing – of the entire European Union. A common fund could in practice fulfil an important role in stimulating crucial EU cooperation initiatives in the field of defence and security. Although these initiatives perhaps will initially start small and mainly on a bi- and mini-lateral basis, according to the neo-functional theory spill-over effects will ultimately result in cooperation on a wider basis.

Currently we are witnessing a trend that cooperation is increasingly taking place in the form of 'coalitions of the willing'. An appropriate example of these types of coalitions are NORDEFECO or EDA's JDEAL. Although these coalitions often are not EU-wide, they do however – according to the neo-functional theory - pave the way for potential wider networks. These pooling and sharing initiatives therefore need to be further encouraged.

Red tape and chaotic as well as time-consuming bureaucratic processes are currently in a deconstructive manner undermining the efficiency of EU cooperation initiatives. Over the past century, NATO has gained comprehensive insight in the process of multinational defence and security cooperation. A deepened EU-NATO cooperation could stimulate the frameworks of security cooperation initiatives within the EU. In this way the implementation of the Union's ambitions can most likely be boosted. In an attempt to reduce chaotic as well as time-consuming international bureaucratic processes, EU-member states should expand the powers of the high-representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the field of political as well as policy matters. At the moment, individual nations are still pursuing their own interests on a large scale, and perhaps this is not always beneficial for the entire Union. In addition to increasing the powers of the high-representative, EU-member states should go even further and aim to eventually appoint a comprehensive EU-defence minister, as well as a EU 'ministry of Defence' under his/her authority.

An essential part of ambitions to boost security and defence cooperation is that nations should no longer merely stimulate their own national defence industries, but rather try to open and develop a communal EU defence industry. There are several benefits attached to standardising these industrial norms and standards. First, there currently is too much unnecessary overlap in the field of for example the purchase of equipment and research and development. Second, it creates operational benefits like the easy exchange of communal material to those who need it. Third, a 'made in the EU' label could enhance further integration and it will strengthen the position of the EU's industry in the global market. Finally, financial benefits – especially in these times of drastic defence budget cuts - should not be left out. The necessity of pooling and sharing is becoming more and more obvious. In an incentive to promote the new generation of pooling and sharing initiatives, the work of the European Defence Agency should gain more attention on both the national and European political level.

Although EU-member states should aim high with their ambitions, an realistic attitude should however be part of further European Operational Defence- and Security Frameworks. Several 'bumps on the road', like the supposed EU-wide fear of loss of sovereignty and the sensitive position of national defence industries, will make comprehensive integration and cooperation a long-term commit. This commitment is however not a choice, but a pure necessity. Although the road to comprehensive defence and security cooperation and integration will be bumpy as

discussed above, we should nevertheless be optimistic, and give pioneering initiatives a proper chance to evolve into cooperation success of importance and magnitude.

Almost 25 years ago, Belgian Minister of foreign affairs Eyskens spoke his notorious – yet perhaps true at the time – words that: the EU is an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm. Since then, the environment in which the EU functions hasn't become less ambiguous and indistinct. On the contrary, the EU is - as we speak - being challenged by numerous security threats, both internally as externally. European institutions have however not stood still in this changing environment, and hopefully in short we can agree that the EU no longer merely is either a political dwarf, nor a military worm.



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European Security & Defence: the Future is Now Multinational Operational Frameworks - Countering DAESH propaganda

BY WORKING GROUP 10

Introduction

The imminent threat of Daesh (Also known as IS or ISIL, red.) to the European Union has been spurred on by various propaganda methods. Examples of these are the utilisation of digital media and hate preaching. The reach of Daesh has thus not only manifested itself in the Middle East or the African continent, but also on the European peninsula. One of the many effects of this propaganda has led to the radicalisation and recruitment of young European citizens. So far, the European Union member states have failed – individually and collectively – to sufficiently counter the influence of DAESH. It has become clear that this issue demands a transnational and EU-wide approach.

Temporary Committee within the European Parliament

Our proposal is the creation of a temporary committee within the European Parliament in order to engage civil society, strengthen multinational governance, and encourage intrastate technical cooperation.

A parliamentary committee could be the necessary first step towards effective policy-making in order to combat DAESH propaganda.

Furthermore, it would stimulate inter-state communication of best practices that should be enhanced to create a wider and accessible network of knowledge regarding (de)radicalisation processes. A temporary committee within the European Parliament could also be utilised to deliberate existing (un)successful national approaches.

Countering DAESH propaganda via a multinational communication framework will not only allow the European community to combat terrorism at home, but perhaps also abroad. In other words, collectively we have a wider reach.

Engagement of Civil Society

Strengthening a communicative nexus between European civil society and (intra)governmental institutions is necessary. Engaging the public in political discussions has to frequent at a larger extent in order to collectively find solutions in combatting the influence of DAESH propaganda. The European Parliament provides a platform that could facilitate such a discussion on a European level. The inclusion of non-state actors with expert insights (such as non-governmental organisations) could stimulate an understanding of the root causes and potential solutions.

The primary underlying motives for wide scale DAESH propaganda are the recruitment of new fighters and intimidation. The European civil society is easily penetrated via digital and traditional channels, which demands a strengthening of its resilience.

Propositions could include educational programs about the process of radicalisation. For example, parental support could be offered as a preventive measure in order to disrupt the susceptibility of radicalisation. Furthermore, it is vital that the Islamic community gets involved in this process; religious leaders have a big influence on the explanation of faith and they can also see, at an early stage, radicalising views of their followers.

Preventive measures such as the disruption of the radicalisation process should primarily be stimulated locally and initiated at a European level. In other words, this would entail the engagement of Mosques and communal centers to monitor youth activity that has radical tendencies. This makes communication between local instances and governmental bodies a necessity.

Good Multinational Governance

One of the weaknesses of the EU in its approach to counter DAESH propaganda is the inability to merge 28 different national voices into a collective response. The penetration of DAESH propaganda via hate preaching is an clear example which highlights this weakness and demonstrates the necessity for multinational governance on intelligence sharing.

This requires certain levels of trust, which is an important ingredient for combatting DAESH propaganda. Good multinational governance is only possible with the cooperation of military, judicial, law-enforcement bodies on regional, national, and European level.

Technical Cooperation

It is vital for European Member States to share critical information regarding DAESH propaganda and radicalising youth. Countries that have efficient intelligence capacity should be more prone to share their information on DAESH. This is also in their advantage, since this multinational threat crosses tangible and intangible borders. In order to enforce preventive

measures, technical cooperation within transnational frameworks is essential. Capacity sharing between member states can insure that national defence and intelligence capabilities are strengthened.

Conclusion

Propaganda is one of DAESH's most inexpensive and efficient tool to recruit and intimidate the European Union as a whole. It is the source and underlying reason for DAESH's threat. Setting up a temporary parliamentary committee can instigate good governance, stimulate the involvement of civil society, and create a basis for multinational technical cooperation. It is important to stress that the above mentioned measures can prove to be essential in combatting the propaganda tools used by DAESH. The implementation of these actions might be complicated, and requires high levels of trust and political will between European member states.