

A MARITIME STRATEGY FOR THE EU.

Europe, western Cape of the Eurasian continent is bordered by many seas and has inherited old maritime cultures. The maritime nations, members of the EU, have a common responsibility regarding the Union maritime security. Outside territorial waters, the sea is international. This is a fact which requires more and more co-ordination from the bordering states and becomes all the more topical as globalisation has a strong influence on the maritime affairs.

1. Maritime environment - risks and threats

European maritime stakes are global, as is shown in their dependence upon the sea lanes for supply (95%), furthermore through it's member states, Europe owns overseas territories that are assets thanks to the EEZs but are difficult to protect because of their remoteness. The traditional maritime powers are declining, whilst new powers are emerging: China, Korea, and Brazil, which are acquiring impressive capabilities amongst which combat navies. The globalisation of economies and exchanges, renders paramount a securisation that the European institutions have to provide:

1.1 Globalisation: a challenge for Europe.

The current globalisation has produced an undeniable growth of maritime activities:

- Increase in maritime trade
- seabed resources (oil and minerals)
- halieutic resources (as an answer to the food challenge)
- System of production of renewable offshore energies
- Flow of economic information passing through submerged intercontinental cables
- Economic importance of coastal areas and maritime hubs
- Rivalries between naval shipyards and marine equipment suppliers

- Growing number of human beings living at sea.

All these activities demand a secure environment which must become the concern of the EU.

All the more as they are becoming real stakes, creating interstate rivalries on some islands, thus generating needs for protection and surveillance for some installations .

1;2 Climatic change and protection of the environment

Protect the environment to limit global warming and preserve resources.

Global warming will allow the use of arctic zones for oil exploitation and navigation through polar eastern and western maritime lanes. The increased exploitation of sea resources and maritime traffic multiplies the risks of pollution and diminution of halieutic resources. It is also likely that storms will be more frequent in the overseas territories of several member states.

1.2 Increase of illegal activities at sea or on the coasts.

The list of illegal activities at sea is long: Illegal immigration, criminal activities such as drugs, weapons, and human beings trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing and terrorism which threatens harbours and offshore installations. To answer these threats, the nations have military navies and various administrations in charge of police at sea. All this requires specialised agencies capable to organise international cooperation.

1-4 EU current maritime policy.

To answer these stakes and risks, the EU has ,started many years ago, to implement politics pertaining to different activities whose coordination has been entrusted to different agencies; Frontex, maritime security Agency, fishing control Agency, maritime operations analysis Centre (Narcotics), and the EU satellite centre.

The “DG MARE” has developed an integrated maritime policy IMP essentially oriented towards economic development, environment protection and safety. Several agencies have been created on a need to exist basis, including DEA which has the technical goal to support research and capacities pooling.

The European Agencies.

EDA: European Defence Agency

Frontex.

In charge of the coordination of borders protection, including maritime borders. The Agency installed in Warsaw reports to” DGHome”; its activities are: organisation of joint operations, training, risks analysis, intelligence pooling of capacities, help to the member states to organise the return of illegal immigrants in their countries. It does have its own maritime platforms but has a significant annual budget of 85 million euros.

EMSA: European Maritime Security Agency.

Installed in Lisbon, it is in charge of maritime security and prevention of hydrocarbon pollution. It has a budget of 52 million euros, employs 240 people and reports to”DGMARE”. One of its major achievements is the creation of information networks SAFESEANET for

security and CLEANSEANET for anti-pollution. These networks are part of the global EU project for maritime surveillance. The CISE (Common Information Sharing Environment) EMSA has no specific instruments, but has a significant budget to procure anti-pollution assets.

EFCA: European Fisheries Control Agency

Installed in VIGO it reports to “DGMARE”. It has a modest budget of 1.7 million euros and focuses on the surveillance of some species and coordination of the rules and means of the concerned Member -States.

MAOC(N) Maritime Analysis Operational Center (Narcotics)

Seven Member States have regrouped within this agency to organise the fight against narcotics trafficking (ESP, F, I, NL, Port, and Ru) It coordinates the surveillance and intelligence assets within a rationale of pooling information. The IOCC is located in Lisbon.

EUSC: EU Satellite Center

It is at the disposal of DGMARE and DGMOUV to participate in surveillance at sea.

2. For a new approach of an European maritime strategy

The EU has the essential responsibility to ensure the defence and security of it's space, citizens, and goods; whether public or private. The challenges and stakes show that the mission cannot be limited to the air and land borders of a Union which is constantly evolving. Furthermore ,the EU has to ensure the global security of it's nationals and interests. The fact that the US has switched its strategic priorities to Asia and the Pacific, requires more autonomy of Europe when it comes to its defence and that means taking a wider share of the defence and security burden in its neighbourhood.

2.1 Areas of EU maritime strategy.

The European institutional architecture is complex. Other organisations have been created aside from the EU a long time ago, which have overlapping ambitions, the first one being the Atlantic Alliance and its military organisation NATO. So that there is no actual continuity between the requirements of Defence and the necessities of Security on the other; particularly for situations or interests whose origin and developments are external. Any maritime activity outside undisputed territorial waters is necessarily confronted with the problem. The discontinuity of strategies which leaves to the States the essential elements of the strategies, weakens the European potential for Overseas actions. It could become regional isolationism whose consequences cannot be predicted in the current context.of Maritimisation .

The goal of the European strategy being to contribute to the improvement of the necessary complementarity between Defence and Security policies within a complex and evolving environment.

A current assessment of the situation is mitigated but identifies several opportunities:

In the field of SECURITY, it is necessary to provide a maritime surveillance of the European coastal areas to conduct the various police missions: fight illegal immigration and various illicit trafficking (drugs, smuggling, etc); protect the environment and security of maritime lanes. The Member States are responsible for these police missions but it requires that coordination and regulation are harmonised at the European level. The key factor is the coordination between the Agencies and the maritime Administrations of the member states ; it must include the naval forces in order to provide a good efficiency of the capacities deployed along the European coastal areas.

The implementation of the EU maritime integrated policy must be continued and improved. In order to conduct these police missions successfully ; it is fundamental to have realtime knowledge of the ships situation in the zone. The installation of information systems to provide integrated maritime surveillance within the CISE is extremely important. The results obtained in 2011 and 2012 by the pilot projects MARSUNO and BLUEMASSMED must be analysed rapidly. It is also essential to continue the development of milestone projects such as MARSUR, CLOSEYE, and CISE and of programme such as EURSUR for the protection of the external borders. All these projects requiring priority and more effective coordination.

In the field of Security ,the promotion of the coastguard function enables us to make a clear difference between the implementation structures and those in charge of capacities building. Adopting this approach would permit to do without creating a new supranational structure which would compete with the existing Administrations. It dedicates more resources to securing European maritime areas by combining the coastal states resources and more importantly enables to organise a coordinated contribution of the whole of Europe which will be beneficial to the stabilisation of exchanges and soon, to the maritimisation of human activities

The pressure of countries having maritime peripheral domains already pushes Europe to strengthen its financial support even reinforcing its own assets for missions of border police. The explosion of piracy , the growing threat for European countries caused by illicit sea trafficking are the driving force of this new awareness. However, the ATALANTA operation off Somalia has revealed the limit if not the lack of adaptation of some capacities, particularly for the logistic support of the deployed combat ships.

Regarding Defence:

The risk of major military attack is now reduced. The foreign powers having the capacities are now linked to globalisation which has created interdependence, thus neutralising the option. However it remains possible to ignore nuclear deterrence and threaten to use long range weapons (ballistic and cruise missiles) or to strike the heart of societies by targeted terrorist actions.

Regarding the first assumption, a global and integrated system of enlarged Air Defence is necessary to guarantee the reactivity of protection within very short delays. In this respect NATO keeps an essential role. In this type of organisation it is necessary to underscore that the naval component must play a major role because of its natural mobility which brings flexibility and reduced expenditure providing it is perfectly interoperable with airland capacities. The first thing is to assess a comprehensive situation in realtime and to have it validated. The technical expertise exists in Europe, it is necessary to have the possibility to develop it and deploy it as widely as necessary without depending upon anybody. Fight against terrorism is the mobilising and sizing factor of the interior Security of the EU.

However it is very dangerous to wait for the threat to materialise in Europe to react. To be informed is necessary but often insufficient; preventative actions under the aegis of the UN led at the very root of the risk are often mandatory (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, and Mali) they require the use of military maritime capacities.

In all the cases there is a need for synergy between Defence and Security that the EU cannot ignore because it is by taking advantage of the gaps that aggressors can seriously weaken the union Member States. Strengthening the links between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance is a major stake in this environment. In particular, it is necessary to clearly identify the role of NATO in the case of crisis where the EU would be in the frontline. The Member States have to accept that the EU becomes the spokesperson for the complete range of necessary missions with the goal to develop a unified capacity for action. The distribution of tasks between the nations, the EU, and the Atlantic Alliance becomes a subsidiary problem, providing the EU has the right tools for Force generation and operation leadership; in particular permanent OHQs. The search for the best options could then become pragmatic thus making the institutions more effective.

Faced with the temptation to let each bordering country annex the sea, the EU can play a fundamental role by federating the concerns and be leader in the search of solutions for Europe and for the world. This would require an educational effort, because habits are well established and maritime cultures strongly influenced either by the area of activity (Baltic, Mediterranean, and atlantic) or by an overseas presence. This means the EU should be willing, determined, but also cautious and pragmatic. The WEYMAR type regional structures have a role to play in this environment.

2.2 Acquisition of capabilities

The institutions in charge of defense matters explore all the way to a better sharing of existing and future capacities (EDA - Pooling and Sharing; NATO - Smart Defence ...). This effort is benefic, but the anticipated savings are not enough to restore a sufficient European autonomy in terms of its interests. In the naval domain, which operates by nature outside borders, the former experience of a distinction between organic process (creation and implementation of capacities), and engagement of forces (adapted operational system for each coalition of interests) leads to think along these two axes.

Recent operations showed that Member States could take the place of Europe, or even play a leading role in the management of external crises which directly concerned the EU, including the deployment of a major air and sea force in the Libyan crisis. However, they highlighted the most obvious capability gaps for which solutions exist and are not inaccessible, provided that the Union takes quick decisions to fix it.

The European market is not organized to implement a collective strategy. The naval defense market is highly fragmented, even partitioned. In this form, it does not provide a sufficient volume for the development and even the survival of the industry. The only alternatives are

export or internationalization. Under these conditions, the industry is ruled by a very normative system, influenced by NATO on the one hand, and IMO on the other hand, and dual (military and civil) including support vessels (logistics or security aspects). The way is wide open to the influence of foreign industries, allied or from emerging countries, such as Korea, even though the reverse is not always verifiable.

The fact that naval resources is a matter of sovereignty is also a limiting factor, especially with the difficulty to reduce overcapacity in a period of crisis in which jobs become the main concern.

Attempts to restructure the shipbuilding industry are systematically facing these challenges. The joint statement of requirements is not sufficient if everyone interprets the specifications according to his views and ambitions.

The market for security and maritime security, which is not supported by a structured industrial sector, can barely emerge, due to its limitation to civil functions with several administrations and solutions. It has difficulties to expand beyond the necessary platform for coastal missions, because it is unable to gather enough own resources or to pool mobile and autonomous means

Mobilization for the emergence of a single market in Europe, covering the whole maritime domain, beyond the only naval capabilities, intermediate between markets of coastal states on the one hand and export of other, capable of sustaining a viable industry around a European technological base encouraged by the EDA, would be the first step of a great unifying project. Working in such a market does not impose any renunciation of national sovereignty concerning the conditions of the implementation of capacities which would follow.

2.3 International cooperation

The establishment of a European maritime strategy would be fully implemented if it is accompanied by a real international opening. Three areas deserve special attention:

- For Europe, the sea must become a priority topic of diplomatic and external action on all fronts (economy, security and defense). The EU can be an ideal interpreter within all major dedicated international organizations, including NATO.
- The European action stands in line with the UN to guarantee its legitimacy in a multipolar environment where emerging countries, primarily China, will play a decisive role. However, it must expand its normative potential in all areas, both civil and military, so that the European influence can proceed upstream in IMO and NATO.

- Finally, the EU must also establish itself as a player in the Arctic zone to defend its political and economic interests, in anticipation of the opening of new routes and the exploitation of new resources.

The development of such a strategy goes through the development of cooperation with third countries sharing the same vision. The approach can also focus on sea basins, particularly the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea on the one hand, and the Baltic on the other. Finally, the interests between Africa and the whole of Europe are converging, and recent events in the South of the Sahara do not go against this analysis. Securing the maritime approaches of many African states that are struggling to organize themselves can enable them to develop resources exploitation and offshore activities. It is an ambitious project that deserves wider mobilization in Europe, beyond the EUCAP Nestor mission to the Horn of Africa or what is done in Libya.

A European maritime strategy must be comprehensive. In addition to the economic aspects of the Integrated Maritime Policy, it must include the security dimension for the surveillance of maritime approaches and various police operations at sea, but also a defense dimension, including the fact that the EU uses often military vessels to CSDP missions.

3. The European Maritime Strategy – practical recommendations

- The objective of the concept of a “European Maritime Strategy” is to link the Integrated Maritime Policy to the European Security Strategy, due to the fact that “all European seas and oceans related matters are linked together and that all policies with a maritime dimension should be developed collectively if we want to have some results”.
- The EU should be more active to fulfil strategic goals, more capable by reducing duplications and better combining the diverse European capabilities. The EU should also be more coherent with the coordinated management of the EU maritime tools, linked to the Member States maritime activities.

3.1 Contributing to the world maritime domain security

The EU should have a stronger voice in global maritime security, develop a comprehensive approach and make significant progress in the sharing of maritime information with members in order to develop knowledge and support the growth of maritime activities where there are European interests.

Member States should make efforts to adapt their navies to more multi-mission capabilities, such as maritime safety, humanitarian assistance, protection of offshore energy resources, fight against illegal trafficking of all kinds, and more generally, the protection of the environment without prejudice to specific national missions.

3.2 Implementing the European Maritime Strategy based on current sea basin strategies.

Although the concept of European Maritime Strategy is developed as a whole, economic development, maritime safety and protection of the marine environment must be implemented in sea basins to be appropriate and effective.

It must indeed take into account that the growth of maritime activities and their security can be threatened by a variety of local risk factors: sensitivity to climate change, diversity of marine ecosystems, competing interests, presence of illegal trafficking, specific navigation conditions...

In some areas, this regional approach will help to develop a maritime security in conjunction with the neighborhood, according to the European Security Strategy.

The development of basin maritime safety requires real-time information of maritime surveillance. To this we must give high priority to CISE project and its sea basins applications.

3.3 Coordinating EU maritime agencies between them and Member States authorities

Cooperation of all agencies and authorities, both civilian and military, should be developed as much as possible, so that a more integrated approach for decision-making processes.

In particular, the EU should seek a new balance between the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), mainly focused on the economy, and the Common Security and Defence Policy, which often employs military capabilities, knowing that the first should be strongly supported by the latter.

Synergies should be found between the existing regulations currently implemented by dedicated agencies (environmental protection, fisheries, drug trafficking, illegal immigration,

navigation safety and operation of offshore resources) and therefore insufficiently comprehensive.

In practice, it is necessary to organize an audit of EU maritime agencies to determine how to implement this "coordinating authority", a real EU General Director for maritime affairs, and see how the "co-location" of some of them can improve their coordination.

3.4 Coordinating the participation of the Member States within International Maritime Organizations

We need to develop a common European view of maritime issues. In particular, European regulations coordinated with the proposals of Member States should be the cornerstone of international legal agreements on oceans and seas.

The EU should promote the proper functioning of institutions and a legal framework based on international maritime law. The Member States should work together to develop a common point of view and speak with one voice at the UN, the World Trade Organization and the International Maritime Organization.

The EU should expand its cooperation with the third countries in the field of maritime security in accordance with the existing sectoral strategies EU.

3.5 Facilitating the acquisition of capabilities

The market of maritime equipments and services for security and the one for defence, are traditionally two separate markets with two distinct approaches and different standards.

The EU should support the acquisition of maritime surveillance capabilities by establishing a framework of regulation and some cooperation actions in favor of the activities of shipyards in Europe: clusters of specifications, joint research, multinational programs...

A European internal market is a prerequisite for a viable industrial base, able to support the naval sector. CSDP should be the framework to promote it. Moreover, this shall go through the political will to bring together the existing and on-going achievements of maritime nations, which will be joined by those who feel concerned, to draft a capability planning and

roadmaps that collectively express the need (capacity, calendars). In this context, the Eurozone or the Schengen area could be the model. The industry, reassured by the prospect of such an intermediate market, will lead in parallel the restructuring of the sector concerning the acquisition of naval capabilities.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, a EU maritime strategy can not be limited to economic activities. It must include the security dimension. The need for monitoring and control this strategic activity is required. The EU must play its part in building a defensive system and response capabilities to reduce the risk of unexpected aggression and control crisis situations in which its interests or territory may be considered as threatened. The EU benefits from economies of scale that make it more efficient and in a better shape to play a role of maritime power, with the support of maritime nations which are part of the EU. The terms of such a transformation are critical for the long-term success.

Federating the maritime action within the EU is a prerequisite for the establishment of a European maritime strategy. What is already done in that direction, including through the European agencies, merits a careful and prospective review, not to introduce redundancy or deficiency. "WEIMAR + +", ie France, Germany, Poland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, or the BENELUX, countries bordering the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, can be a framework which serve as a starting point for the establishment of a structured cooperation in the field of maritime affairs.